An electron detection interference pattern
In our investigations of the universe, we produce intelligible concepts which are applied as the sufficient reason as to why various phenomenal experiences occur in the way that they do. As soon as we generate such an intelligible concept, we must readily admit that this concept itself, as an object in the mind, has no spatial extension or physical weight etc. thus when we attribute this concept to the universe outside of what we can see, we attribute to the universe an overarching characteristic which renders the universe itself incompatible with the ideas of physical extension and weight etc. When we engage in the study of the Brain (or any phenomenon), and form our corresponding concepts of why the brain appears and acts the way it does, we are obviously generating a conception which is not locateable within the interior of the skull, or anywhere in phenomenal space. However, these conceptions have relations to other conceptions which resemble the phenomenal relationships which we observe in experience. For example, the functional structures which are hypothesized to account for much of the brains activity are hypothesized as existing within the brain itself, within the skull itself, and thus, it is hypothesized, that if we were ever to observe these structures directly, or indirectly, then they would in fact phenomenally be observed in the phenomenal location of the phenomenal brain tissue, encased in the phenomenal skull.
1. Scientific Conceptualization
It seems that there are at least three different levels of conceptual applicability to the universe- Three different categories of concepts which can be implemented in our quest to understand the sufficient reason as to why the universe behaves the way it is observed to behave.
One level represents the conceptual structures which correspond to processes which we could actually phenomenally observe. Examples of this can easily be found in the studies of cellular and molecular biology. Certain structures are conceptualized which are meant to account for the effects seen. Sometimes these structures are found, and thus made susceptible to phenomenal observational methods such as microscope observation or electron microscope observation, or even simple eye-based visual observation.
A second level represents those conceptualized features of the universe which can never be phenomenally (visually) seen, even with instrumentation to assist us, but which nonetheless are susceptible to general understanding through the use of visual models which represent them. Examples of this are the organization of the atom and nuclear processes. One could never phenomenally see the nucleus of an atom, but nonetheless a visual model, or picture of it can be given which enables a certain degree of understanding to be attained in science which gives mankind some new power. One could perhaps phenomenally see the solar system if they had adequate telescopes at an appropriate location in the galaxy.
As a not irrelevant side note- For the purposes of tempering the seemingly rigid categorization which is being laid out here, I would like to look at these examples which seem to be "in between" the first and second categorizations. In the first category, we identified concepts of the human mind which are attributed to the universe and which could be ultimately phenomenally seen under given circumstances. The second category encompassed those concepts of the universe which could not somehow be seen phenomenally, but could be given easy visual representation, like the sub atomic domain. Now, the solar system was an example of this (normally, you can accurately visually depict the solar system but not phenomenally see it), but you could hypothetically go very far out into the galaxy, and, if possessed with a powerful telescope and sufficient time, you could phenomenally see the organization of the solar system. The same thing occurs in the hypothetical situation in which a massive number of luminescent charged particles are released into the earth's magnetic field which enable one to phenomenally see the magnetic field. Now, these examples represent a fuzzy sort of boundary between the phenomenally see-able and the phenomenally un-see-able. What these fuzzy examples actually do, is that they show us the reality of the ever presence of a unifying conception which is generated by the mind which accounts for the way in which we phenomenally see anything at all. Obviously, things are not simply phenomenally seen in a sense which is indifferent to the conceptual forming power of the mind's character.(so-called pure sensation) There are no observations which are "mere facts" as some would like to say. There is always a qualitative conceptualization taking place in all observations. Sometimes, these qualitative conceptualizations become so regular to our experience, that we do not notice them, (I don't think this is a bad thing necessarily). Sometimes this can lead people to forget that the particular qualitative conceptualizations which occur regularly, actually even happen, and as a consequence, these people develop the ideas and attitudes of so-called self evident entities (e.g.) as situated in self evident space and time etc, not realizing that these conceptions are only creations of the mind. This type of misunderstanding leads, invariably, into the process of nominalistic generalization, and definition creating, which takes on the form of axiomatic beliefs. It is through this system of axiomatic beliefs which the person tends to subsequently operate and thus limits their way of thinking.
Thus, in the case of the first category of conceptual applicability, we arrive at conceptions which are generally within the bounds of a particular axiomatic way of thinking about the universe, that is, in terms of objects and so fourth. Thus, we do not find it at all surprising when we find an observed entity in the laboratory, or elsewhere, which corresponds to the hypothetical structure (object) which we postulated as accounting for an observed phenomena. We imagined a thing, an object, and we found the object. We have thus, seemingly, increased our scientific understanding to a certain degree, we may even now have a new power after this "object" has been determined to exist, but can we really say that there was a qualitative change? Perhaps the criticism would come that I am to hostile to the idea of "objects" and that obviously, different objects do different things. I would respond by saying that I am not hostile to finding those postulated objects of scientific research which enable the scientific expansion of mankind's ken, rather, I am simply identifying, that the idea of "object" is an idea. There are no self evident objects. There are simply many things in the universe which mankind has been subjected to, which fulfill, or "practically" allow for, the particular qualitative conceptualization of "object"- but that does not mean that the idea of object can not change, that it exists forever, or that it even existed before man conceived of it. So, when someone phenomenally sees an "object" it should be remembered that it is not self evident. I wish to briefly emphasize- This isn't necessarily an evil thing in all circumstances. For example, if you walk into your house one night, and all of your belongings are missing, you ask the police to find the person which did it. You can (and should) do this with full faith that the police will fully understand what you mean by person, and not interrogate you as to why you are being axiomatic in your tendency to automatically attribute your idea of "person" to every phenomenal experience of a particular class. A long digression here could be taken as to the relationship of culturally/socially disseminated concepts of self evident objects, including conceptually new ones, and the development of mankinds cultural operations and economic systems but it would take a long time.
Now in the second category of conceptual capability, we have a similar situation, but we reach the point in scientific investigation in which we begin to understand, in a more visceral sense, that we are in fact not investigating the simple "merely factual" relationships of "things out there in the universe", but rather, we are investigating (utilizing) the process of construction which the human mind itself implements when coming to understand, through the principles of reason, those phenomenal experiences which obtain in that mind. For in this case, the visual model itself is a conceptual apparatus, as well as an extrapolation of the concepts which are commonly associated with everyday life such as objects and space etc, into the domain of the universe which cannot be directly phenomenally seen, whether it be in the small or large. We see this in the case of the popular conceptions and visual models of the atom and the nucleus wherein the conceptual extrapolations of objects and space are visually represented in neat drawings and animations. Obviously, certain conceptions of this type offer degrees of usefulness to the purposes of mankind in his activity. But, as said before, they also demonstrate, in a certain way, (or at least point to) the complete identity of the ontological nature of the universe with the ontological reason of human thought (if it is considered). (Like the old question- "The universe as far as you know it, is defined by that knowledge, or by those conceptions, which you have of it. For how could you imagine a universe which lies outside of some particular conception of it?") However, a yawning abyss of emptiness awakens within the mind of the person who seriously thinks about this concept of "the visual model", and they are haunted by the question, "what if that's not the whole truth?". Someone could say that "this will do" in answering that question. They might even respond with hostility if you were to propose that perhaps the universe was not limited in its composition to those characteristics which are typical of commonplace sense perception, such as objects in space etc. This leads us into the area of the third category.
The third category of conceptualizations which are applicable to the universe, are those ideas which cannot be visually phenomenally seen, or visually phenomenally represented. The features of the universe which correspond to these ideas are the features of the universe which we can not draw pictures of, or attribute auditory, or spatial, or temporal characteristics to. These are the characteristics of the universe which seem to exist without the limiting constraints which we would normally attribute to the conceptions of existent entities of the universe which "extended in space" and "act in time". The scope of the effects of these principles do not seem to be constrained by the limiting factors of spatially extended continuity as we saw with objects, and/or kinetically connected events which we associate with processes taking place amongst objects. This third category encompasses the principles of life, of beauty, of justice. It also includes features of the universe which are not necessarily so "transcendental"- It would seem that we would need to include in this category those features of the universe which provide the reasons as to why these particular, above mentioned, characteristics are observed in the domain of things like the atom through phenomena such as quantum effects. For, as we can see, when the characteristics and the quantum effects of those parts of the universe which are termed electrons and so fourth are conceptualized in terms which correspond to the conceptual domains of sensual representation (e.g. Particles and waves) we see that paradoxes, and sometimes even despair and insanity, can arise. This third domain even applies to those concepts from areas such as physics which are generally thought of as simple. The concept of force, for example, is not representable through visual models, or even quantitative definitions, as Kohler points out. It is a concept of striving, of intention which manifests itself in various ways. Cold physicists even admit the existence of force in the universe, although, perhaps without knowing that they are admitting that the universe has qualities which are incredibly "human". This is the domain, these are the principles, in which a science of physical economy rests. Determining the essential characteristics of a cultural mode of operation. Identifying the principle methods of thinking which disseminate and coalesce into filaments of influence within the society as a whole, how these various filaments are bound to influence one another. The causal principles by which these very characteristics are acted upon and changed. All this, and more, represents problems of physical economy.
Would we foolishly say that those characteristics of the universe are any less real that those of the first two categories? Would we be so silly as to presume that those concepts which have corresponding visual representations are more real than those which have none? Would we assume that these principles play no role in determining the necessary physical relationships which adhere in observed phenomena- any less of a role in determining the character of phenomena than those simply identifiable concepts which have there visual models bounded by the simple rules of Euclid?
Some may respond by saying that the concepts of the universe which are visually representable are more real because they are easily related back into the domain of every day phenomenal experience, the domain of sense perception. They may elaborate on this by emphasizing the absolute necessity of experimental determination of the validity of any hypothetical concept which is promoted for acception into the domain of science. This assumes, however, that the feature of the universe which the hypothetical concept in question indicates, produces a permanently fixed, and easily quantifiable, effect which can be generalized and axiomatized. As to the idea that the concept must always be related to the domain of what is phenomenally seen, I completely agree. The only issue is that, once again, the particular kind of relationship which exists between the concepts of the first and second class, the concepts which have visual representability, those concepts will always be related back to the observed phenomena of the phenomenal world in one kind of way- they will conceptually integrate into the world of phenomena through the idea of spatial relationships and extension, either as greater or lesser, as bigger or smaller, than the phenomena in question for which they are conceived of to explain. For example, take the measurement of the difference in angles of the shadows from equally tall sticks at different longitudinal points at the same time of day. This will imply a particular concept of the general topology of the earth- that it is a sphere with a specific radius determined by those observed phenomena. This is a scientific conception which "integrates" back into the world of phenomena in a way which is determined by the concepts of spatial relationship and extension indicated by Euclid. We have a sphere which is big, and whose dimensions (phenomenal relations) correspond to these measurements. The same principle was illustrated when we illustrated the example of the hypothetical functional structures of the brain- you can't see them, but they are in fact visually representable, and maybe observable, these concepts are related to the world of phenomena, to the phenomenal brain, in a way which indicates a spatial relationship- they are "inside" the phenomenal brain, as the earth's globe was "outside" the phenomenal measurements. The same is true of the current conceptions of the atom, the nucleus, and the other "particles"- these conceptions integrate into the world of phenomena through spatial relationships (very small) and certain physical processes. All conceptions which have visual characteristics to them are of this form, as phenomenal visual space is the same as Euclidean space. Given the reasonable way in which these various causal factors conceptually fit together in such a way, it is not surprising that they "fit" together in such a way in phenomenal "space". (The conception (or idea) of an atom itself is obviously no larger or smaller than the conception (or idea) of the earth itself, but these two conceptions have a specifically defined relationship between them in reference to their conceived relative magnitudes. This relationship is, obviously, carried over into the phenomenal world. It leaves an Erie feeling in one, as to how the mental constructs work this way, just as they appear. But, based on the nature of these constructs themselves, as being extrapolations of phenomena, it makes sense. It reminds one that the world of phenomena is really composed of nothing but constructs, there is no universe which is not mind, there is no matter. So how "large" are we to say these features of the universe are? There is no absolute space to compare them to, this it is a matter of mere relation.
In response to the objection above which asserted that the universe has to work with perfect regularity, and thus any conceptualized feature of the universe which one generates must imply the characteristic effects which are permanently consistent and quantifiable, we say the following- If the epistemological work of Heraclitus, Cusa, Leibniz, Philo, or LaRouche were accessible to this contrarian, then he would have no such objection. No two things can ever be the same, no two objects, no two moments in time, no two actions, thus, the idea of an equation, or a quantifiable relationship which is a permanent law of the universe is impossible. Besides, these types of "laws" are generally not derived from a conceptualized feature of the universe, they generally are attained through observational generalization and induction. Much more could probably be said on this, but later.
How then should we characterize the way in which the concepts which have no visual model integrate and are related to the phenomenal world? This, of course, is a different question for each different scientific principle in question, the answer to any specific example would of course constitute the very scientific basis of the idea. However, just as we used specific examples of how concepts are related to the world of phenomena for those of the last two categories, but used them in a way which enabled us to identify a general feature of that integration, then perhaps we can do the same for these principles of the third type. Take a musical piece for example. The idea that the musical concept- that concept which provides the sufficient reason as to why the observed phenomena (the notes) to occur in the way they do- is somehow spatially "outside" or "inside" the notes- this idea doesn't really apply here. Sometimes we hear that the idea is "outside" or "above and encompassing" that which is heard, or "in between" or "permeating" the notes. But all these statements do not refer to an integration of the idea with the phenomenon in any spatial sort of way. Obviously, the musical idea is not located in space, and it is obviously not located at a point in time. Perhaps, however, it could be said, that the idea is "expressed" through time. The musical idea, which, as a thing is never separated from its phenomenal counterparts, is what provides all the causality requirement necessary to explain the particular ordering and nuance of the observed phenomena. A key thing about the principles of the third type which one runs into as they write about them, is that it is clear that these principles beg the question of human passion, for, in fact, they are expressions of the creative passion within the soul of mankind. In the case of physical economy, the identified principles of the universe express themselves through the activity of human beings. With much similarity to the way in which a musical idea determines, at every moment, the unfolding of the piece, similarly, the cultural features and mental characteristics of the society determine, at every moment, the unfolding development of the society. Each individual human is obviously not attached to every other person in his society with metal chains which force all the individual moving parts to attain a particular effect, but the attachment of each in a society with all, is nonetheless physical, it is the common mental characteristics, the cultural mode of operation, the collective intention, and the reverberating effects of axiomatic shocks which result in the ebbs and flows of the mass strike, it is all these which tie the individuals together in the domain of mind and thus in the universe. All of the causality requirements which account for the way in which societies develop is enveloped in these passion-ridden conceptual considerations. The identification of these principles, even that of simple force, require the reliving of the passion which are their fundamental characteristic, in order to truly understand them. The "easy" conceptualizations, which require no passion to hold in the mind, although they do take passion to attain them (to a greater or lesser degree), are generally limited and eventually found false. The passion of the third type however, emphasizes the primary reality of all the universe, the process of development, as opposed to understood rules- that is the primary substance of the world. That is the most valid science. The concepts of the third type, by definition, must relate to the phenomenal world of sense-perception in a way which is termed ironical, or paradoxical, or metaphorical. This is a natural consequence, as mentioned before, of the lack of applicability of phenomenally (visually) created models to the concept. This type of visual modeling can only be attempted, but as said before, the phenomenal correlative of a third-type concept must necessarily be an ironical, or metaphorical tool of discovery. The passion which accompanies such concepts is thus an absolutely essential characteristic of them because it is only through passion that the metaphorical, the ironical, the paradoxical, can be resolved within the mind. True, the same can be said of those discovered features of the universe which are visual concepts- we are given a paradox and we use the passion of creativity to arrive at the featured solution who's character may be of type one or type two. However, the immortality of a discovery lies not in the formally presentable solution or concept, it lies in the process of bringing that about. All concepts which are of a formal character must eventually find invalidity, for the universe, and our conceptions of the universe always change. But, for those concepts of the third type, there never is a solution to the presented irony of a formal character. Rather, the concept is itself reflective of the process which takes one from a lower concept to a more truthful one.
2. The Paradox of the Quantum
Now we have a perfect example of this problem which was identified in the section on the axiomatization of concepts. The limits of the applicability of the concepts of the first and second type are clearly illustrated by the so called uncertainty principle. It identifies the limit of the ontological applicability of the concepts of the first type to the universe. This results from the experimental observations which demonstrate that energy is not expendable in a fashion which would be indicated by the concepts of the first and second type. That is to say, by any magnitude of continuously linear increase or decrease. Some have chosen to conclude from this the following: "This means that not only are our concepts of structure and causality inapplicable to the universe but it also means that there are in fact no causes which account for the reason as to why electrons behave the way they do."
Lets look at this again. You have certain conceptions, particle, space, time, etc, and their dependent conceptions such as velocity. These conceptions were thought to apply to the universe generally, there was no reason to think otherwise by the people who utilized them. It was thought that all physical events could be elucidated in terms of these concepts, that, even down to the level of the atoms, the concepts of objects, space, time, and velocity could be applied, and thus used for the purposes of prediction. Naturally, it was also assumed that we could always experimentally measure these conceptualized features of the universe down to indefinite levels of size, by continually improving the accuracy of our measurements- that is to say, by continually reducing the magnitude of exchange of energy between that which is detected and that which is the detector. However, one day, it was discovered that this necessary feature of the process of measurement- the energetic interaction of the detected and the detector- could not be reduced indefinitely, that it was, in fact, quantized to a very particular magnitude. This implied that there was no possible way to ever apply the concepts of position (space) and velocity (time) to an object with an indefinitely increasing degree of accuracy. Some, upon seeing this, were not completely overwhelmed with wonder- they simply said "Well, just because you can't determine the position and the velocity of objects beyond a certain threshold of accuracy because of the inability of making the energy exchange between the object and the detector smaller that this particular threshold- that doesn't mean that you can't still say that the velocity and the position don't exist! Of course they exist, you just can't detect them due to the nature of the currently known methods of detection. But, hypothetically, one could use a detector with an ability to impart an amount of energy onto the object which is lower than the Planck threshold, and this would give you the corresponding measurement of the velocity and position. This should be able to go on forever hypothetically, even if energy transfers in physical nature are limited in there smallness." However, a response came "How real are those concepts (position, velocity etc) if they can never be determined experimentally? Those concepts are not observable now, they cannot, by virtue of the physical characteristics of the world, be observed ever, and thus they are not real. There are only probabilities which can be used to describe the regularity of the experimental results (effects). There is no conception of cause which we will attribute to the observed effects, because our most basic notions of cause and effect, which are typified by the prevailing conceptions of classical physics (objects, space and time), cannot be applied in any way experimentally, and thus their validity cannot be tested." The first person may have responded by saying, "We'll that's just nonsense, of course they exist- it is just that there are some cases in which you can't determine their values." The second person may have responded again "Don't be so sure. The observed effects which are produced by the electron under experimental circumstances in which there are no amounts of energy imparted to the electron by the detecting apparatus (and thus in which there is no determination of velocity or position) do not correspond to the effects which are predicted to occur under these same circumstances by the concepts which you are claiming apply. Thus, the idea of causality must be discarded as inapplicable, and you must take on the approach of statistical probability in enumerating and predicting the effects of physical phenomena. Sure, you can use your human ideas of causality in the realm of big objects, where the fundamental inadequacies of these concepts is not manifested in a way which is significant to the purposes of prediction and analysis. But, ultimately, all this phenomena is the result of the averaging of random events which are bounded by a certain set of statistical probabilities."
(As a quick side note, this whole paradox is a result of the experimentally demonstrated universal characteristic of quantized energy.(as well as the observed patters of electron hits in the double slit experiment) This phenomena too can not be explained with notions of causality which are associated with space, objects and time. There is currently no attempt to explain why energy would be quantized in such a way. It is probably the case that if a reason for this effect could be given then it would include notions of causality which also transcend those of the first and second type. The solution to this problem is probably inextricably linked to the solution to the electron pattern problem.)
We see thus illustrated, a case of tragedy, which results from, as all tragedies do, the inability to overcome the axiomatic conditions which bound the conceptual ability to overcome the paradoxes and subject the universe to reason, to the mind of mankind. Here we see how a classic "false dichotomy" has been created- On the one hand, you have the the "classical", LaPlacian, scientist, who clings to the kinetic notions of causality which are typified by classical mechanics. This implies the nullification of any concepts of free will, the soul, the existence of the good, values etc. and usually leads people into a world of bestial savagery- But then they say that at least it lets us make definite predictions etc and subject the world to reason. Then, on the other hand, you have the people who promote the idea of the probabilistically describable randomness of the universe, and how this liberates man from the rigid constraints of the LaPlacian notions of causality, and opens the door to the ideas of free will etc. Unfortunately, as a result, this universe, by its nature, has no susceptibility to reason, and thus no lawfulness can be attributed to it, not for the behavior of particles, and especially not for the notions of the ideas of good and evil and values etc. this usually leads, as we see with the baby boomer quantum mystics, to bestial savagery. As we can see, both schools of thought have a common effect- they both separate man from the universe: One by eliminating the notions of his values and even the existence of his soul from the universe. The other, by eliminating his ideas of lawfulness and reasonable action in the universe, and thus the idea of universal values. Is it surprising that two schools of thought which are so radically different in their epistemology can have such similar implications to their axioms and such similar effects on people (like turning them into immoral animals)? We can identify the common feature of both of these schools of thought (which isn't that they separate man form the universe, because that was just an immediate consequence of each one of their mutually contradictory sets of axioms) which leads to this situation. That common feature is the notion that causality is bounded by those conceptualizations of the first and second type (I will elaborate). This is, of course, false. It seems like a real scientist would have come to this same conclusion- That instead of discarding the concept of causality itself from physics because it can not, as it is currently conceived of, account for certain observed effects; that does not mean that we can not simply change our conception of causality itself. Einstein seems to have come to this conclusion at least.
"I believe that events in nature are controlled by a much stricter and closely binding law than we suspect today, when we speak of one event being the cause of another. Our concept here is confined to one happening within one time section. It is dissected from the whole process. Our present rough way of applying the causal principle is quite superficial.
We are like a child who judges a poem by its rhyme, and not by its rhythm. Or, we are like a juvenile learner at the piano just relating one note to that which immediately precedes or follows. To an extent, this may be all very well, when one is dealing with simple compositions; but it will not do for the interpretation of a Bach fugue. Quantum physics has presented us with very complex processes, and to meet them, we must further enlarge and refine our concept of causality."
As I elaborated on above, the process of science is one in which precise concepts are implemented by the mind in order to make those phenomenal experiences which take place within that mind susceptible to understanding and reason. The concepts which are implemented for this purpose may have a very limited, or wide, range of plausibility, and the process of discarding old concepts and replacing them with new concepts is a natural process in science which is to be expected. However, when any concept is lifted, consciously or unconsciously, to the level of axiom, the possibility that this process of progress will continue disappears, science must stop. Perhaps scientific progress of a type which is limited by the constraint of axiom can take place, and sometimes even very important scientific progress can take place which is of this character. But eventually there will be found a boundary condition in which it is no longer possible to render phenomena susceptible to reason, to the extent that reason is bound to the axiom which is most impertinent to the cause of the phenomena in question.
This is what has happened to science in the modern day. This is what accounts for the paradoxical interpretations of the quantum effect. The concepts which, in this case, have been lifted into the realm of axioms, are the concepts of "objects", "space", and "time" as well as their dependent concepts such as "velocity". The progress of science, has, up to this point, been accomplished while still retaining these axiomatic features. The bulk of mathematical physics for example is composed of quantitative statements called "mathematical equations" which relate these three elements and their derivatives to each other in unique ways. The notion of causality in science is thus bounded by these axiomatic conceptions. These conceptions had been thought to be applicable to the universe in general up to the point of the double slit experiment which showed that there was no way that an "object" could "pass through the space" of one slit or the other and produce the pattern of effect which was observed on the other side. (All attempts to explain the observed effect in these terms of "object" or "wave" moving through "space" were found insufficient, and the task is impossible given the experimental findings) It was then stated that, because of this, the concept of causality had to be abandoned- the attempt to try to explain why the electrons produced the pattern they did had to be abandoned, and people were going to have to be satisfied with the probability functions which described the patterns. A real scientist would have asked "If we can't account for the pattern in terms of "objects" moving through "space", then what new conceptions of causality are we to take up which will render these phenomena intelligible?" The lack of this question amongst the scientific community shows the common feature of both schools of thought. It is the axiomatic adherence to the notions of "objects", "space", and "time" and the conceptions of causality which are associated with them, which is the common feature of both schools. It is the common feature of the axiomatic adherence to the idea of causality which is bounded by those conceptions of the first and second type. One school says that things happen, objects behave, in space and time according to definite rules formulated in terms of space and time etc. The other school says that things happen, objects behave, in space and time randomly, and they can only be described statistically. You can see what's common.
Why is this this axiomatic adherence so strong? Why is it that few people but Einstein have ever asked that simple question above? I think that we have to look at the oligarchical principle and the often referenced role of Bertrand Russell in implementing the methods of Aristotelian intelligence-method operations throughout the twentieth century. As to why these methods are so effective, we can point to the way in which the conceptual processes of the mind generate ideas automatically in some cases, and how these ideas become axioms. This was elaborated on earlier. The concepts of space and time and objects are all of this type. The ideas of causality which are based within these notions were found to be inadequate to account for the phenomena, and it was said that because of that, that causality had to be thrown out. It is akin to throwing the baby out with the bath-water. But that's what the British like to do, as we see with their genocide policy abroad, as well as their own Liverpool Care Pathway in England. The argument is similar to the other British-Malthusian argument which says that since oil is limited, and we all depend on oil, then eventually we will run out and all die. True, those notions of causality had to be discarded, or modified, but causality in general does not. The inability of those scientists to see even the possibility of this type of conceptual shift is the root cause of the entire historical debate over this issue, as well as for all the strange expressions of the various types of psychoses which have overtaken much of the scientific community (as is evidenced by the baby boomer mystic quantum philosophers and the radical reductionist positivists) and for all the false debates over mechanical causality vs randomness which perhaps millions of unfortunate people have been sucked into throughout the years since Solvay, and for untold other deleterious effects which have been wrought on society by the unwitting purveyors of those evil intentions which created this lie in the first place.